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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital 
inflows to identify overvalued equity.  This is a relatively exogenous 
overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying – buyers with excess 
liquidity – rather than what is being purchased.  We document substantial stock 
price impact associated with purchases by high-inflow mutual funds, and find the 
probability of an SEO, insider sales, and the probability of a stock-based 
acquisition increase significantly in the four quarters following the mutual fund 
buying pressure.  These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able 
to identify and exploit overvalued equity.  
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Seasoned equity offerings have been widely studied in the literature, with little emerging 
consensus on their determinants and economic consequences. Proposed determinants of SEOs 
include capital investments, refinancing, liquidity squeezes, corporate control, stock market 
microstructure and timing by managers with private information that their stock is overvalued 
(Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002)). In 
this paper we propose a novel approach to testing the market-timing motive for SEOs, and 
provide evidence of SEO timing.  
The main empirical challenge in tests of SEO timing is identifying overvalued firms. 
Prior studies examining market timing have typically used high market-to-book ratios or high 
past returns as identifiers of overvaluation.  However, these studies “continue to be hotly 
debated” (Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007)) because, as described in detail in the next section, 
traditional indicators of overvaluation are correlated with other determinants of SEOs.  We 
respond to this debate in the literature by identifying a setting where overvaluation is relatively 
exogenous to the firm.  In particular, we identify overvalued stocks as those subject to substantial 
buying pressure by mutual funds experiencing large capital inflows, but not subject to 
widespread buying pressure by other mutual funds, and refer to these as stocks subject to Inflow-
driven Buying Pressure (IBP).  In this setting, the overvaluation is associated with who is buying 
– mutual funds with excess liquidity – rather than by what is being purchased. 
Mutual funds with large capital inflows are eager to invest the cash since stockpiling cash 
makes it difficult for them to outperform their benchmarks (Coval and Stafford (2007)) and since 
they may be precluded by their investment mandate from holding large cash balances.  This 
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excess liquidity is channeled into a narrow set of stocks since mutual funds follow specialized 
investment strategies (i.e., they face restricted investment opportunity sets or IOS), and since 
they likely face diminishing marginal investment prospects.  Consistent with restricted IOS and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects, we document that the average number of stocks held 
by mutual funds in the top capital flow decile is 107, which is a small fraction of the universe of 
stocks.  Further, there is a monotonic positive relation between mutual fund flows and the 
proportion of existing positions expanded by these funds.  Funds with higher inflows expand 
more of their existing positions as opposed to initiating new positions, and in particular, 39% of 
the existing positions of funds in the top flow decile are expansions of previously held positions.  
Funds with higher inflows have about the same proportion of newly initiated holdings as other 
funds.  This is in contrast to a positive relation between fund flows and initiations that would be 
expected if fund IOS and investment prospects were unrestricted. 
We expect inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure to result in upward stock price 
pressure, if individual stocks have downward sloping demand curves.  To identify overvaluation 
associated with mutual fund inflow-driven buying pressure rather than with fundamental 
information about the firms, we require IBP stocks to meet two ex ante conditions: (i) they are 
subject to buying pressure by mutual funds in the top flow decile; and (ii) they are not subject to 
buying pressure by mutual funds in other flow deciles.  Using these criteria we identify about 
1.5% of all mutual fund trades as IBP.  We then document that IBP stocks have average prior 
year returns of 49%, and experience a cumulative decline in market-adjusted returns of 10% over 
the six quarters subsequent to the buying pressure quarter, consistent with overvaluation due to 
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inflow-driven buying pressure.  In contrast, stocks subject to widespread buying pressure by 
mutual funds other than those in the top decile of capital flows (WBP stocks) have average prior 
year returns of 32%, and experience a cumulative decline in market-adjusted returns of 2.8% 
over the subsequent six quarters, consistent with widespread buying being driven more by firm-
specific information.
1
  The large abnormal return reversion of IBP stocks after buying pressure is 
not consistent with alternative explanations that inflow-driven buying is informed, or that high-
inflow fund managers are smart stock pickers. 
Identifying equity with pronounced and sustained overvaluation (IBP stocks) is a 
precondition to our main objective, testing the SEO timing theory.  If managers privately identify 
overvaluation and time SEOs to exploit the overvaluation, we expect IBP-affected firms to 
exhibit a higher likelihood of SEOs relative to all firms that are not overvalued.  We find 172 
SEOs associated with IBP stocks, collectively accounting for $23b of new equity. This 
represents 5.2% by number, and 6.6% by dollar value, of all SEOs in our sample.  We test the 
timing hypothesis by estimating a Logit model of SEO choice that controls for a number of 
determinants of SEOs, including prior returns and the market-to-book ratio. In addition, we 
construct a number of matched samples in which we first match IBP firms to other firms on 
selected firm characteristics, and then compare SEO probabilities in the „treatment‟ and „control‟ 
samples in the four quarters following IBP. In all tests, the probability of an SEO following IBP 
stock-quarters is significantly higher, ranging from 30% to 84% higher probability.  This 
suggests firm managers identify overvaluation and time SEOs.    
                                                 
1
 In our formal tests, when comparing the behavior of IBP stocks to the relevant reference groups, we control for 
various firm characteristics, such as prior returns. 
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To corroborate the evidence on SEO timing we test two other predictions.  First, if IBP 
firms are overvalued we expect an increase in insider sales. We therefore test for increased 
insider sales in the four quarters following IBP.  We estimate a multiple regression model of 
insider sales (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), Jenter (2005)), and 
also test for differences in mean insider sales in matched samples.  In all tests, we find 
significantly higher insider sales in the four quarters following IBP, ranging from 5.3% to 9.3% 
higher sales ratios.  An increase in insider sales of IBP stocks is not consistent with alternative 
explanations that inflow-driven mutual fund purchases are informed.  However, it is consistent 
with our hypothesis that excess fund liquidity, combined with funds‟ restricted IOS and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects, is associated with some overvalued purchases.   
Second, if IBP firms are overvalued we expect them to exhibit a higher likelihood of 
stock-based acquisitions in the four quarters following IBP.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Jensen 
(2005) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) suggest overvaluation is 
associated with stock-based acquisitions, and increases the probability of deal initiation or of 
completion of previously initiated deals.  We find 268 acquisitions associated with IBP stocks, 
collectively accounting for $309b of transactions.  This represents 3.9% by number, and 9% by 
dollar value, of all acquisitions in our sample.  We test the timing prediction by estimating a 
Logit model as well as conducting tests of differences in acquisition frequency in matched 
samples.  In most tests of M&A probability in the four quarters following IBP, we find the 
probability of an acquisition is significantly higher, ranging from 19% to 35% higher probability.   
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Our findings collectively support the hypothesis that managers exploit “windows of 
opportunity” (Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997)) presented by overpricing of their firms‟ equity 
to time the market.  Our findings are also consistent with a broad class of models in which 
capital markets are imperfect but managers are able to identify price dislocations (see Baker et al. 
(2007) for a review).  The equity market timing theory has implications for external financing 
choice, for the firm‟s capital structure if the impact of timing is persistent, for corporate 
governance in terms of allowing managers discretion to exploit or ignore market price signals 
that differ from their private assessment of value, and for understanding determinants of insider 
trading.  
Finally, we note as a caveat that we establish an association, rather than a causal relation, 
between buying pressure and overvaluation. As we note above, the causal interpretation is 
consistent with our collective empirical evidence, but without a rigorous proof of causality we 
cannot rule out potential alternative explanations for the association.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I briefly describes our setting and 
reviews the prior literature on SEO timing and price pressure.  Section II describes the 
identification of overvalued stocks as a result of inflow-driven buying pressure by mutual funds.  
Section III describes tests of SEO timing, insider sale timing and M&A timing.  Section IV 
discusses a number of sensitivity tests.  Section V concludes with a summary, discussion of some 
implications of our findings and suggestions for future research. 
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I. The Setting 
 A number of papers have examined whether managers time the market when issuing 
equity.  The main empirical challenge is to identify mispriced stocks, and prior authors have used 
ex ante and ex post methods to infer mispricing (Baker et al. (2007)). 
 Ex ante methods include using a measure of fundamental value scaled by market value 
such as the market-to-book ratio, or using prior returns, to identify overvalued stocks.  As 
emphasized in Baker et al. (2007), both measures are difficult to interpret. For example, 
measuring fundamental value is difficult since accounting book values are based on historical 
costs and subject to discretionary managerial accounting choices.  Further, the market-to-book 
ratio is correlated with many firm characteristics that may drive financing policy, so high 
market-to-book ratios do not necessarily indicate overvaluation that can be exploited by market 
timers.  Prior returns as a measure of mispricing face similar difficulties in interpretation.  Firms 
with high prior returns may have discovered valuable growth opportunities and harvesting these 
opportunities, rather than market timing, could drive the issuance decision. 
 Ex post methods rely on reversion in future abnormal returns to infer overvaluation.  For 
example, tests of long-horizon stock return performance following SEOs find underperformance, 
suggesting that issuance occurred when the stock was overpriced.  One challenge to this 
interpretation is that risk changes may be associated with SEOs.  For example, Eckbo, Masulis 
and Norli (2000) suggest that equity issuance lowers leverage and therefore systematic risk, 
leading to lower future returns.       
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 In this paper we use ex ante information to identify overvalued stocks, but our identifier 
is an event rather than a firm characteristic. In particular, the event is large uninformed buying 
pressure by mutual funds with large capital inflows.  We document that this event is associated 
with large abnormal returns and subsequent return reversion, and argue that this event is likely 
exogenous to the firm since it is associated with who is buying – buyers with excess liquidity – 
rather than with what is being bought. We discuss our identification method in detail in the next 
section.  
Prior empirical evidence of short-lived price pressure in equity markets is presented in 
Kraus and Stoll (1972), Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986) and Mitchell, Pulvino and 
Stafford (2004), and evidence of slightly longer-lived price pressure of a few weeks is presented 
in Greenwood (2005).  However, relatively short-lived price pressure precludes testing the equity 
market timing theory.  Evidence of price pressure due to flow-driven mutual fund trading, with 
prices persistently reverting over a few quarters, is presented in Coval and Stafford (CS, 2007), 
but our paper differs in a number of ways: (i) our objective is to test the equity market timing 
theory, while CS do not test the timing theory; (ii) our focus is on inflow-driven buying and we 
offer a story for the resulting price pressure, while CS focus on and offer a story for outflow-
driven firesales; and (iii) our mispricing identifier differs in that our mispricing candidates are 
stocks subject to buying pressure by funds in the top flow decile (first condition) but not subject 
to buying pressure by other funds (second condition).  The mispricing identifier in CS imposes 
our first, but not our second, condition.     
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 Consistent with our results, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) use mutual fund flows as a 
measure of individual investor sentiment, and find that high sentiment (or dumb money) predicts 
low future returns.  They also report that high sentiment is associated with increases in shares 
outstanding in the next three years.  Our paper differs in a number of ways: (i) our focus is on the 
timing of SEOs and we provide extensive tests of the SEO timing hypothesis; (ii) we show that 
insider sales are timed to exploit overvaluation; (iii) we show that stock-based acquisitions are 
timed to exploit overvaluation; and (iv) we show that managers respond to overvaluation in a 
more timely manner, within four quarters of being affected by IBP.  
Our paper is also related to Chen et al. (2007) who examine whether hedge funds exploit 
mutual fund trading pressure through front-running.  We examine whether a different group of 
market participants, firm managers, exploit IBP through SEOs, insider sales and M&A.  
Consistent with Chen et al. (2007), our results suggest that “sophisticated” market participants 
are able to identify this particular source of mispricing (price pressure due to inflow-driven 
mutual fund purchases),
2
 although our data allows us to provide more direct evidence since we 
are able to match SEOs, insider sales and M&A to IBP-affected stocks.    
 
II. Mutual Fund Trading Pressure and Stock Price Impact 
 Mutual funds experiencing large capital inflows face the unique challenge of excess 
liquidity: quickly finding productive opportunities for the new capital.  Stockpiling cash is likely 
against their charter, and is also likely to increase tracking error with respect to their all-equity 
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 Anecdotal evidence suggests large investment banks also keep track of mutual fund flow-driven price pressure.   
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benchmarks.  Since funds follow specialized investment strategies we do not expect the excess 
cash to be invested widely in the universe of stocks.  Rather, funds‟ restricted IOS and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects are likely to result in the excess cash being channeled 
into a narrow set of stocks and creating buying pressure in some stocks.  We expect the buying 
pressure by such funds to dislocate prices of the stocks they choose to buy (e.g., Coval and 
Stafford (2007)).     
For each stock held by mutual funds, we form a measure of trading pressure as follows.  
First, we define mutual fund flows as:  
 
Flowj,s = {TAj,s – TAj,s-1(1+Rj,s-1)} / TAj,s-1          (1) 
 
where TA is total net assets of mutual fund j in month s, and R is the monthly return for fund j in 
month s.  We sum the monthly flows each quarter to obtain the quarterly flow, flowj,t, of mutual 
fund j in quarter t.  Monthly total net assets and returns of mutual funds are obtained from CRSP, 
and quarterly mutual fund holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial.  Mutual funds are 
required to report their holdings semi-annually, but approximately 60% of them report their 
holdings quarterly.  To calculate quarterly changes in holdings, we retain only contiguous fund-
quarters in our sample.  In addition, we only consider open-ended U.S. equity funds and 
eliminate funds with investment objective codes indicating bonds and preferred stocks, 
international stocks, metals and municipal bonds from our sample. 
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[TABLE I HERE] 
 
Table I shows quarterly flows, prior-year returns, the total number of holdings, and the 
percent of holdings that were expanded or initiated, by mutual fund flow decile, for 63,426 fund-
quarters from 1990 to 2007.  Table I shows a large spread in flows, ranging from 40.3% for the 
top decile to –17% for the bottom decile.  Prior-year fund returns decrease monotonically from 
16.6% for the top decile to 6.1% for the bottom decile.   This confirms evidence in the prior 
literature that (a) fund flows vary monotonically with past fund performance, and (b) the flow-
performance relation is asymmetric in that inflows due to good past performance are much larger 
in magnitude than outflows due to poor past performance (Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)).    
Table I also shows a roughly inverted U-shaped relation between fund flows and number 
of holdings, with funds in the top flow decile holding on average 107 stocks.  Funds with 
extreme flows have fewer holdings on average than funds in the middle deciles of flows, 
suggesting that for some funds extreme performance may be associated with more concentrated 
positions.  A monotonic positive relation (weakly U-shaped relation) between fund flow decile 
and the percent of holdings expanded (initiated) is also documented in Table I.  39% of the 
existing holdings of funds in the top flow decile have been expanded from the prior quarter, 
while 19% of their existing holdings are new initiations (the remaining 42% of holdings have 
either been maintained or reduced from the prior quarter).  These results are consistent with 
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mutual funds having restricted IOS and diminishing marginal investment prospects for each 
additional inflow dollar.   
We calculate trading pressure for stock i in quarter t as:  
 
Pressurei,t = 
{ 
j
,0(max( ∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t>90
th
 percentilet) – 
j
,0(max( −∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t<10
th
 percentilet) } 
/ Shares Outstandingi,t-1               (2) 
 
where i indexes the stock, j indexes the mutual fund and t indexes the calendar quarter.  This 
measure is similar to those used in Coval and Stafford (2007) and Chen et al. (2007).
3
  
Intuitively, trading pressure is interpreted as buying pressure when funds with large inflows (top 
decile of flow in quarter t) are net buyers of the stock, and as selling pressure when funds with 
large outflows (bottom decile of flow in quarter t) are net sellers of the stock.  In a sense, 
Pressure is a measure of excess demand from mutual funds with large capital flows. 
To distinguish flow-motivated trading from potentially information-motivated trading, 
we calculate unforced pressure for stock i in quarter t as:  
 
UPressurei,t = {
j
∆holdingj,i,t | 10
th
 percentilet≤flowj,t≤90
th
 percentilet } / Shares Outstandingi,t-1           (3) 
 
                                                 
3
 Results are robust to using average lagged quarterly trading volume over the prior two quarters as the denominator 
in calculating Pressure, as well as to excluding the max function, as reported in the internet appendix. 
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This variable captures net trading activity in a stock by mutual funds in the middle eight deciles 
of flows, or widespread net trading.  Information-driven purchases are identified as stocks in the 
top decile of UPressure.  UPressure is similar to measures used in Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) and Wermers (1999) to identify mutual fund demand imbalances. 
We sort stock-quarters into deciles of Pressure and UPressure, and identify IBP stocks as 
those in the top decile of Pressure but in the middle three deciles (deciles four, five and six) of 
UPressure.
4
  In other words, IBP stocks are those that are subject to large buying pressure by 
mutual funds with extreme inflows, but that are not subject to widespread net trading pressure by 
other mutual funds.  IBP stocks are our overvaluation candidates.  To examine whether the 
overvaluation of IBP stocks is driven by inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure, rather than 
by mutual fund buying pressure generally, we contrast the abnormal return pattern of IBP stocks 
with those of stocks in the top decile of UPressure.  We refer to stocks in the top decile of 
UPressure as WBP (Widespread Buying Pressure) stocks. 
 
[TABLE II HERE] 
 
 Table II shows stock-level means of all variables for three samples: the full sample of all 
stocks used in our tests, IBP stocks, and WBP stocks.  Accounting data are obtained from 
Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly.  We exclude all securities that do not have a share code of 
10 or 11 in CRSP.  Insider trading data are obtained from the Thomson Financial Insider 
                                                 
4
 Results are robust to intersecting the top Pressure decile with the middle two, or middle four, UPressure deciles, 
as reported in Section IV. 
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database.  The full sample includes 313,750 firm-quarters from 1990 through 2007.  The IBP 
sample consists of 2,515 stock-quarters, and the WBP sample consists of 17,160 stock-quarters, 
from 1990 through 2007.  All variable definitions are presented in the notes to Table II.  Table II 
shows that IBP and WBP stocks are similar in all characteristics with the exception of prior year 
return, which is 49.3% for IBP stocks and 31.9% for WBP stocks, and Insider Sale, which is 
0.483 for IBP stocks and 0.462 for WBP stocks.  The differences in prior year return and Insider 
Sale are expected if IBP stocks are overvalued.  IBP and WBP stocks are also different in terms 
of Pressure and UPressure, but these differences occur by construction.  Finally, both IBP and 
WBP stocks are different from the full sample of stocks in several dimensions. 
 
[TABLE III HERE] 
 
Panel A of Table III shows quarterly mean abnormal returns from quarters t−4 to t+6 for 
stocks subject to mutual fund buying pressure in quarter t=0 (Pressure is calculated in quarter 
t=0).  Abnormal returns are industry-adjusted returns, using the Fama-French equal-weighted 48 
industry portfolios.  We calculate mean abnormal returns each quarter for the portfolio of IBP 
and WBP stocks, and use the time series of portfolio abnormal returns for statistical inference to 
control for cross-sectional correlation (e.g., Fama and MacBeth (1973), Coval and Stafford 
(2007)).  In Panel B of Table III abnormal returns are the alphas, or intercepts, from Fama and 
French (1993) factor model regressions.  IBP and WBP stocks are added to their respective 
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portfolios in the quarter following buying pressure, and held for three years or five years.  Panel 
B reports monthly alphas in percentage points.           
Panel A of Table III shows that IBP stocks experience significantly positive abnormal 
returns in buying quarters, followed by persistently negative abnormal returns in subsequent 
quarters as the buying pressure subsides.  IBP stocks have cumulative average abnormal returns 
of -9.82% (p-value<0.05), from quarters t+1 to t+6.  In contrast, WBP stocks experience small 
negative abnormal returns after quarter t=0, with cumulative average abnormal returns from t+1 
to t+6 of -2.68% (p-value<0.10).  In Panel B, IBP stocks have statistically significant monthly 
Fama-French alphas of -0.36% (-0.31%) for three-year (five-year) holding periods, while WBP 
stocks have insignificant alphas. The abnormal return reversion for IBP stocks, but not for WBP 
stocks, is consistent with inflow-driven buying pressure resulting in overvaluation, and 
widespread mutual fund buying being associated with favorable firm-specific information.    
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 1 shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for IBP and WBP stocks.  
We sum average abnormal returns over consecutive quarters to obtain the cumulative average 
abnormal returns shown in Figure 1.  The CAAR patterns in Figure 1 suggest that flow-driven 
mutual fund purchases result in substantial overvaluation, or a shift in the demand curve for a 
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stock.  In contrast, widespread buying by mutual funds (non-inflow-driven purchases) does not 
seem to result in overvaluation.
5
  
 
III. Main Tests 
 Using the IBP stocks identified as overvalued in the previous section, we now turn to our 
main objective, testing the theory that firms exploit “windows of opportunity” to time SEOs 
(e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002)).  
Section A presents tests of SEO timing.  To corroborate the inference from Section A, we also 
test whether insider sales are timed (Section B) and whether stock-based corporate acquisitions 
are timed (Section C).     
 
A. Timing of SEOs  
 We test whether firms identify and exploit the overvaluation associated with mutual fund 
flow-driven buying pressure by issuing seasoned equity within four quarters of the stock being 
subject to IBP.  We do not examine SEOs contemporaneous with buying pressure to avoid 
confounding inferences through any reverse causality (i.e., that mutual funds may be buying 
because firms are issuing equity, rather than the reverse, which is our hypothesis).  The prior 
evidence in the literature suggests a four-quarter managerial response window allows sufficient 
time for firms to go to market once they decide to have an SEO.
6
  Before the offering, firms have 
to register securities with the SEC and may also undertake marketing efforts to discover or create 
                                                 
5
 Figure 1 depicts firm-level, not mutual fund-level, performance.   
6
 Results are robust to using a two-quarter managerial response window as reported in the internet appendix. 
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demand.  Registration can be „traditional,‟ in which case firms register each offering 
immediately prior to the offering, or „shelf,‟ in which case firms pre-register future potential 
offerings up to two years in advance and simply take-down these pre-approved offerings as they 
go to market.  Shelf registrations have much lower registration times. Marketing activities can be 
full or accelerated, depending on the time taken for demand discovery by sellers and due 
diligence by potential buyers, and take about two weeks for full marketing and as little as a day 
for accelerated marketing.  Overall, including both registration and marketing times, the average 
time between the SEC filing date and the offering date for SEOs is about 30 business days (e.g., 
Gao and Ritter (2010)). 
We test our hypothesis of SEO timing by estimating a Logit regression of the issuance 
decision in quarter t, including an indicator dummy for stock-quarters with IBP in any of the four 
quarters from t-4 through t-1, which allows a managerial response window of four quarters.  
Linear regressions of SEO choice on determinants have been estimated in, for example, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010).   
 Following the prior literature (e.g., Eckbo et al. (2000)), we obtain SEO data from the 
SDC database.  After retaining only common stock issuances that trade on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ, and excluding investment trusts (e.g., REIT‟s), American Depositary Receipts, 
utilities (SIC codes 4910-4939) and secondary offerings in which no new shares are issued, we 
are left with 3307 SEOs between 1990 and 2007 that have all the required data for our tests.  We 
exclude utilities since the duration of the regulatory approval process limits the ability of utilities 
to time SEOs in response to temporary overpricing (Eckbo and Masulis (1992)).  There are 172 
  
17 
SEOs of IBP stocks in the four quarters following IBP, and they collectively account for about 
$23b of stock issuance.  This represents 5.2% by number, and 6.6% by dollar value, of all SEOs 
in our sample. 
 
   
[TABLE IV HERE] 
 
Table IV, Panel A, shows the results of Logit regressions for the seasoned equity issuance 
choice.  The dependent variable is 1 if the firm has a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in quarter t, 
and zero otherwise.  Buy Pressure, our main independent variable of interest, is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 through t-4, and zero 
otherwise.  The other independent variables are determinants of the equity issuance decision 
suggested in the literature, and are described further below.  The regressions include industry, 
year and quarter fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (two-
dimensional clustering) to control for cross-sectional and time-series correlation (Petersen 
(2009)).   
There are four regression specifications reported in Panel A of Table IV.  The first 
specification is estimated over the full available sample of 313,750 stock-quarters.  The other 
three specifications are estimated over smaller samples in which each IBP stock-quarter is first 
matched on industry and two other variables noted at the top of the respective column.  For 
example, in the second column, each IBP stock-quarter is matched with another stock in the 
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same quarter and industry and the same asset growth („first matching variable‟) and ROA 
(„second matching variable‟) quintile.  If there are multiple matches, we pick the match closest in 
the first matching variable.    This procedure does not yield a match for some IBP stock-quarters, 
but we do not relax the matching requirements because this would defeat the purpose of 
matching.  Sufficient sample sizes remain after matching, as noted in the tables.  We match on 
prior returns and book-to-market (BTM) since these are known determinants of SEOs and have 
also been used as overvaluation indicators (e.g., Jenter (2005)).  We match on asset growth and 
ROA since profitability and growth are likely important determinants of the external financing 
decision (e.g., Fama and French (2005)).  Once the matched sample is obtained, we estimate the 
Logit over the four quarters following IBP, controlling for other determinants of SEOs as in the 
full sample Logit.  This is because, even in a paired sample, there continues to be heterogeneity 
in firm characteristics, including heterogeneity in the matching variables across pairs. 
The main result in Panel A of Table IV is that the Buy Pressure dummy is significantly 
positive, with one-tailed p-values less than 0.01 in three specifications and less than 0.05 in the 
fourth specification.  This suggests that, ceteris paribus, firms are significantly more likely to 
have SEOs in the four quarters following flow-driven buying pressure.  In terms of economic 
significance, in the full sample test the probability of an SEO in the four quarters following 
buying pressure is 58.6% higher for IBP stocks compared to other stocks.  The percent increase 
in SEO probability is 49.6% for the BTM-Size matched sample, 29.7% for the Return-Size 
matched sample and 83.5% for the Asset Growth-ROA matched sample.  These results hold after 
controlling for prior annual returns and the book-to-market ratio (BTM) which have been used as 
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overvaluation indicators in the prior literature.  The interpretation is as follows.  Consider two 
firms with similar prior returns and BTM, only one of which was IBP-affected.  Under our 
hypothesis the IBP firm is overvalued, while, as described earlier, high prior returns and low 
BTM may be interpreted as due to fundamental news.  The timing hypothesis suggests Buy 
Pressure should load after controlling for fundamental news in prior returns and BTM, and the 
hypothesis is supported in Table IV. 
Also in Panel A of Table IV, the probability of issuing equity is significantly increasing 
in the one-year return in all samples, and significantly decreasing in the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) in three samples, consistent with firms issuing equity after they have experienced high 
returns (e.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986), Loughran and Ritter (1995)) or when their market 
values are high relative to book values (e.g., Jenter (2005), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2010)).  Leverage loads significantly positively in all samples, consistent with “financially 
constrained” firms being more “equity-dependent” (e.g., Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003)).  ROA 
is significantly negative in all three matched samples, consistent with more profitable firms being 
less dependent on external financing.  Asset growth is significantly positive in three samples, 
consistent with a need for external capital to finance growth.  The change in stock return 
volatility over the prior year loads significantly negatively in all matched sample regressions, 
which is consistent, for example, with an increase in volatility delaying an SEO due to the 
increased basis risk in going to market.  The loadings of other variables vary across samples in 
significance or sign.    
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To relax the linearity assumption implicit in the regressions of Panel A, Panel B of Table 
IV reports SEO frequencies and a test of difference in SEO probabilities for IBP versus matching 
firms, for each of the three matched samples used in Panel A.  In all three matched samples, the 
probability of an SEO in the four quarters following IBP is significantly higher with one-tailed p-
values less than 0.01, consistent with the evidence in Panel A.  For instance, in the Return-Size 
matched test, the relative frequency of an SEO is 1.4% in the matched sample, compared to 1.9% 
in the IBP sample, which represents a 38% increase in SEO frequency.  Overall, Table IV 
provides support for our main hypothesis that firms time equity issuances to exploit exogenous 
overvaluation. 
 
B. Timing Insider Sales  
 If managers identify and exploit price pressure by timing SEOs, we expect them to time 
their personal sales similarly.  This is a powerful test of our hypothesis that mutual fund 
purchases of stocks we identify as IBP are overvalued and result from funds‟ restricted IOS and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects, as opposed to the alternative information hypothesis 
that IBP stock purchases are due to favorable fundamental information about the firm.  We 
expect insiders to sell more shares in the four quarters following IBP if the IBP stock is 
overvalued (our hypothesis), but not if their firm faces favorable future prospects (the 
information hypothesis).  The hypothesis is tested by estimating regressions of insider sales in 
quarter t, including an indicator variable for Buy Pressure as defined earlier.   
 The power of our test to detect timing by managers is potentially limited by the fact that 
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firms frequently restrict insider sales to certain short windows, e.g., within three to twelve days 
after quarterly earnings announcements (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000)), or require managers 
to maintain a certain minimum level of holdings.  We expect this is unlikely to be an issue 
because: (a) we examine insider sales over the four quarters following flow-driven buying 
pressure, not within a narrow window of a few days; and (b) this limitation biases against our 
ability to reject a null hypothesis of no change in insider sales. 
 
[TABLE V HERE] 
 
 Panel A of Table V shows results of panel regressions with Insider Sale, the ratio of 
shares sold to the sum of shares sold and purchased, as the dependent variable.
7
  All trades are 
open market trades.  The regressions include time and industry fixed effects, and standard errors 
are clustered on both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering).  Four regressions are 
estimated, one for a full sample of 211,227 stock-quarters with all available data, and one each 
for three matched samples.  We match on prior one-year return and size, and on BTM and size, 
since returns and BTM have been used as overvaluation identifiers in the prior literature, as noted 
earlier.  For the third matched sample we match on size and lagged insider sales to control for 
individual managers‟ persistent liquidity and diversification needs.  The main result in Panel A 
of Table V is that the Buy Pressure dummy is significantly positive in all samples with one-tailed 
p-values less than 0.01.  The coefficient of Buy Pressure is of 0.027 in the full sample regression.  
                                                 
7
 Our dependent variable, the sales ratio, is similar to that in Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2005) who use the purchase ratio, calculated as shares purchased divided by the sum of shares purchased and sold. 
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Since the mean of Insider Sale in Table II is 0.4003, this suggests that insider sales increase by 
0.027/0.4003 = 6.9% in the four quarters following IBP, which is an economically significant 
magnitude. 
 Also in Panel A of Table V, Insider Sale is increasing in firm size in all samples, 
consistent with Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Core et al. (2006).  Insider Sale is 
significantly positively related to the past one-year return, suggesting that insiders sell relatively 
more than they purchase when the stock price is high relative to the past.  Insider Sale is 
generally decreasing with the BTM decile in all samples, consistent with Rozeff and Zaman 
(1998), Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) and Jenter (2005).  The BTM decile dummies are labeled 
BTM1, BTM2 and so on, with BTM1 being low and BTM10 being high book-to-market.  BTM10 
is omitted from the regression and so it is the reference or base decile.  This result suggests 
insiders at high growth firms sell relatively more than they purchase compared to insiders at 
value firms, consistent with exit or diversification needs of insiders at high growth firms.    
As in Core et al. (2006) we control for insiders‟ normal propensity to trade with lagged 
Insider Sale, and find that Insider Salet-4 is significantly positive with p-values less than 0.01 in 
all samples.  Insider Salet-4 effectively controls for unidentified omitted variables in our 
regression.  We control for the level of insider holdings, Insider Holding, and find that it loads 
significantly positively with p-values less than 0.01 in all samples, suggesting insiders sell more 
when they have higher exposure to firm-specific risk through higher holdings. 
In Panel B of Table V we relax the linearity assumption implicit in the regressions of 
Panel A.  Panel B reports the mean Insider Sale ratio for IBP vs matching stocks for each of the 
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three matched samples, as well as p-values for a test of difference in means.  For each matched 
sample, insider sales are significantly higher for IBP stocks in the four quarters following IBP, 
with p-values less than 0.01.  Overall the results in Table V align with those reported in Table 
IV, and suggest insiders are able to identify overvaluation and subsequently to time both firm-
level equity issuances and insider sales.    
 
C. Timing Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Jensen (2005) suggests overvalued equity is used as currency to finance stock-based 
acquisitions.  The models in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) also predict the same, while the empirical evidence in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and 
Viswanathan (2005) suggests acquirer overvaluation is higher in completed deals than in failed 
deals.  Hence, if IBP stocks are overvalued, we expect a higher likelihood of stock-based 
acquisitions in the four quarters following buying pressure because overvaluation can affect both 
the likelihood of deal initiation as well as the likelihood of completion of previously initiated 
deals.  However, the power of our test is potentially limited if: (i) acquisitions require time, and 
overvaluation diminishes with time; (ii) higher overvaluation than results from flow-driven 
mutual fund purchases is needed to trigger acquisitions; and (iii) mergers occur primarily in 
waves, in response to industry-wide rather than firm-specific overvaluation.  Our overvaluation 
indicator is firm-specific (recall that Table III and Fig 2 show industry-adjusted negative 
abnormal returns for IBP firms after the buying pressure quarter). 
 We test for M&A timing using Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if 
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the firm completed an acquisition in quarter t, and zero otherwise (Harford (1999) also estimates 
linear regressions of the M&A decision).  M&A data is obtained from the SDC database.  We 
find 268 acquisitions associated with IBP stocks, collectively accounting for $309b of 
transactions.  This represents 3.9% by number, and 9% by dollar value, of all acquisitions in our 
sample.  The main independent variable of interest in our Logit regressions is the Buy Pressure 
dummy, defined as previously.  We control for prior one-year return and BTM because these 
have previously been used as overvaluation indicators.  We control for cash, ROA and dividend 
yield because profitable firms that retain cash are more likely to acquire (e.g., Jensen (1986)).  
We also control for size and asset growth over the prior year (e.g., Harford (1999)). 
 Table VI, Panel A, reports results of four Logit regressions, one estimated over the full 
sample of all available firms, and the other three estimated over matched samples.  The Buy 
Pressure dummy is significantly positive with a p-value less than 0.01 in the full sample Logit, 
and the coefficient indicates an increase in acquisition probability of 20%.  It is also significantly 
positive with a p-value less than 0.05 in the sample matched on asset growth and ROA, with a 
coefficient indicating an increase in acquisition probability of 24.3%.  The Buy Pressure dummy 
is insignificant in the other two matched samples (Return-Size and BTM-Size).  Panel A of Table 
VI also shows that return, size and asset growth are significantly positive in all samples as 
predicted (e.g., Harford (1999)), and BTM is significantly negative as predicted.  ROA is 
significantly positive in the matched sample regressions, consistent with more profitable firms 
being more likely to engage in an acquisition. 
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[TABLE VI HERE] 
  
 In Panel B of Table VI we relax the linearity assumption implicit in Panel A and report 
acquisition frequencies, as well as a test of difference in M&A probabilities for IBP versus 
matching firms, for each of the three matched samples.  IBP firms are significantly more likely to 
acquire than matched firms, with p-values less than 0.01 for the Asset Growth-ROA and Return-
Size matched samples, and less than 0.05 for the BTM-Size matched sample.  The increase in 
acquisition probability ranges from 18.7% (BTM-Size sample) to 34% (Asset Growth-ROA 
sample).  Overall, the evidence in Table VI supports the earlier evidence that firm managers 
identify and exploit overvalued equity. 
  
 
IV. Additional Analysis 
 In this section we conduct a number of sensitivity tests.  We summarize the results  below 
and report all tables as well as additional tests in the online appendix.  
 
 (i)  Our return-matched tests are designed to address the possibility of a non-linear relation 
between prior year stock returns on the one hand, and SEOs, insider sales, and M&A on the 
other.  We further address the possibility of a non-linear relation using dummies for the first nine 
return deciles, labeled ret10 to ret 90.  For the top return decile, we use percentile dummies 
labeled ret91 to ret99.  Hence, we simultaneously control for ret10, …, ret90, ret91, ….., ret99 in 
the main regressions and find the results are robust.  In particular, the probability of an SEO is 
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50.5% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.2% higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of 
a stock-based acquisition is 26.8% higher (p-value<0.01), in the four quarters following IBP.    
 
(ii)  Our hypotheses contrast IBP stocks with all other stocks.  The rest of the stocks include 
WBP stocks, and we do not separately control for a WBP indicator in our main tests.  WBP stocks 
are subject to widespread mutual fund buying pressure, which potentially reflects favorable 
information about these firms and their investment opportunities. Thus, it is quite likely that 
WBP is positively correlated with future SEOs and acquisitions.  Such correlation may arise due 
to the relatively favorable investment opportunities of WBP firms (Table III and Figure 1 suggest 
that WBP stocks are not overvalued since there is no return reversion after WBP). As an 
extension of our benchmark specification, we include an indicator variable for WBP. We use this 
indicator to absorb some of the unexplained variation in the dependent variable across the sample 
of non-IBP stocks.   Results are robust to including an indicator for WBP stocks.  In particular, 
the probability of an SEO is 58.6% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.5% higher (p-
value<0.01) and the probability of a stock-based acquisition is 26.9% higher (p-value<0.01), in 
the four quarters following IBP.    
 
 (iii) We use both newly initiated holdings and expansions of existing holdings by high inflow 
funds to identify IBP stocks. An argument for price pressure associated with investment 
constraints applies more naturally to the funds‟ existing holdings as opposed to the newly 
initiated positions. We therefore modify the Pressure definition to sum increases in holdings by 
  
27 
mutual funds in the top flow decile only if these increases are expansions of previously held 
positions, and not new initiations.  Results are robust.  Specifically, IBP stocks have cumulative 
market-adjusted returns of -7.84% (p-value<1%) over the six quarters following buying pressure.  
In addition, the probability of an SEO is 50% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 5.4% 
higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of an acquisition is 22% higher (p-value<0.01), in the 
four quarters following buying pressure. 
 
(iv)  We identify IBP firms as those in the top decile of Pressure but in the middle three deciles 
of UPressure.  Our objective in intersecting with the middle deciles of UPressure is to isolate 
stocks that are not being widely traded by all other mutual funds.  Although symmetry 
considerations may dictate using the middle quintile of UPressure, we expand our sample of IBP 
stocks by including three middle deciles. As a robustness check, we replicate our key regressions 
while intersecting the top decile of Pressure with either the middle two or the middle four 
UPressure deciles. In both cases we find slightly stronger results.  For the case of the middle two 
deciles of UPressure, we identify 1,523 IBP stock-quarters from 1990 to 2007, with cumulative 
abnormal returns of -12.84% (p-value<0.05) over the six quarters following buying pressure.  
Furthermore, the probability of an SEO is 63% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 6.9% 
higher (p-value<0.01) and the probability of an acquisition is 30% higher (p-value<0.05), in the 
four quarters following buying pressure. For the case of the middle four deciles of UPressure, 
we identify 3384 IBP stock-quarters from 1990 to 2007, with cumulative abnormal returns of 
-7.9% (p-value<0.01) over the six quarters following IBP.  Furthermore, the probability of an 
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SEO is 59% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.5% higher (p-value<0.01) and the 
probability of an acquisition is 28% higher (p-value<0.01), in the four quarters following IBP. 
  
 (v)  We repeat the insider sale tests under an alternative definition of insiders as the top 5 
executives: the CEO, Chairman, President, CFO and COO.  Results are robust, with insider sales 
increasing by 6.6% (p-value<0.01) in the four quarters following IBP.   
      
V. Conclusion 
          Prior literature has examined the price impact of trades by mutual funds with large capital 
inflows and outflows.  We find that stocks subject to buying pressure by mutual funds 
experiencing large capital inflows, but not subject to widespread buying pressure by other mutual 
funds, experience substantial upward price impact.  Since we use widespread mutual fund buying 
pressure as an indicator of informed trading, this result suggests that stock prices change in 
response to uninformed shifts in demand.  
Inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure is a relatively exogenous overvaluation 
identifier for SEO timing studies because it is associated with who is buying – buyers with 
excess liquidity – rather than with what is being purchased.  The price effects of mutual fund 
buying pressure are sufficiently long-lived to allow managers who are able to identify the 
overvaluation to time SEOs, insider sales and stock-based acquisitions. We find that in the four 
quarters following the occurrence of flow-driven buying pressure, the probability of an SEO is 
59% higher, insider sales are 7% higher and the probability of completion of a stock-based 
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acquisition is 20% higher.  This suggests firm managers are able to identify and exploit 
overvaluation. 
Our evidence of long-lived price impact of uninformed demand shifts, while consistent 
with empirical evidence in Coval and Stafford (2007) and the arguments of Shleifer (1986), is 
intriguing.  One possible conclusion is that arbitrage was unsuccessful at flattening the demand 
curve.  Reasons for limits to arbitrage include the unavailability of close substitutes, 
specialization among arbitrageurs combined with a limited number of arbitrageurs, lingering 
differences in investor opinion about the true value of the stock and short sales constraints. 
Alternatively, as Coval and Stafford (2007) point out, market participants may have been 
unaware of the return pattern induced by mutual fund flows because the relevant data was not 
available at that time.  As we show, despite the data limitations, some firm managers were able 
to identify overvaluation in the equity of their own firm and react to it by issuing additional 
shares or selling shares from their personal account. The persistence of the price impact presents 
one opportunity for future research. 
Our findings have a number of additional implications for future research.  First, in an 
international context, smaller markets with fewer close substitutes for individual stocks may 
experience greater price impact from uninformed shifts in demand, which suggests that the 
patterns of predictability we identify may be even stronger in such markets. Second, the 
possibility of persistent stock price dislocation due to uninformed demand shifts has implications 
for managerial performance evaluation and the optimal sensitivity of managerial compensation 
to short-run stock returns.  Third, from a corporate governance perspective, our findings suggest 
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managers are sometimes better informed than the market and are able to identify market 
misvaluations, which has implications for the level of discretion they are allowed in responding 
to price movements through a variety of corporate decisions.  Other research opportunities 
include examining the bond price impact of mutual fund trading pressure and the likelihood of 
subsequent debt issuances, and examining the effect of mutual fund trading pressure on the use 
of cash versus stock in corporate acquisitions. 
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Table I: Mutual Fund Flow Predictability and Prior Performance 
Mutual funds are sorted quarterly into deciles of capital flows.  The sample consists of 63,426 fund-quarters from 1990 to 2007.  Flow is 
calculated as as {TAj,s – TAj,s-1(1+Rj,s-1)} / TAj,s-1, where TA is total net assets of mutual fund j in month s, and R is the quarterly return for fund j 
in month s.  Monthly flows are summed to obtain the quarterly flow, flowj,t, of mutual fund j in quarter t. Prior Fund Return is the fund return 
in the last year.  Avg # Holdings is the average number of stocks in a fund-quarter.  % Holdings Expanded is the percent of stocks held in 
quarter t that were held in t-1 and in which the fund increased its holdings.  % Holdings Initiated is the percent of stocks held in quarter t that 
were not held in t-1.   
 
Flow Decile Flow  Prior Fund Return Avg # Holdings % Holdings Expanded % Holdings Initiated 
Inflow 40.3% 16.6% 107 39% 19% 
9 14.1% 14.6% 122 34% 17% 
8 7.0% 13.2% 149 31% 16% 
7 3.3% 12.1% 145 26% 16% 
6 1.0% 11.0% 144 23% 16% 
5 -0.7% 9.8% 126 20% 16% 
4 -2.3% 9.1% 117 19% 17% 
3 -4.1% 7.8% 106 18% 18% 
2 -6.8% 6.3% 99 18% 19% 
Outflow -17.0% 6.1% 103 16% 20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36 
Table II: Stock-level Means, and Tests of Differences in Means 
Table II reports means for the full sample, for the stocks subject to inflow-driven buying pressure (IBP sample), and for stocks subject to 
widespread buying pressure by all mutual funds other than funds in the top decile of capital flows (WBP sample).  ROA is operating income 
before depreciation over total assets.  1-year Return is the stock return over the prior year. BTM is book value of shareholders‟ equity over 
market value of equity.  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities, over 
total assets.  Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the stock price.  Cash is cash and short-term investments over total assets.  
Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter.  ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the 
previous year.  Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year.  Insider Sale is the ratio of 
shares sold by all insiders to the sum of shares sold and purchased by all insiders in a firm-quarter.  Insider Holding is the number of shares 
held by insiders scaled by total shares outstanding.  The full (IBP) [WBP] sample consists of 313,750 (2,515) [17,160] stock-quarters from 
1990 through 2007.  IBP stocks are those in the top decile of Pressure, but in the middle three deciles of UPressure, in quarter t=0.  WBP 
stocks are those in the top decile of UPressure in quarter t=0.  Pressure of stock i in quarter t is a stock-level measure of flow-motivated trading 
by all mutual funds j, and is calculated as  
Pressurei,t =    
 

j
,0(max( ∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t>90
th
 percentilet) – 
j
,0(max( −∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t<10
th
 percentilet)   
Shares Outstandingi,t-1  
 
UPressure is a measure of widespread trading by mutual funds that is not motivated by capital flows and is intended to capture information-
motivated trading. The middle three deciles of UPressure capture stock quarters that are not subject to widespread net trading in any direction.  
UPressurei,t = {
j
∆holdingj,i,t | 10
th
 percentilet≤flowj,t≤90
th
 percentilet } / Shares Outstandingi,t-1  
The last three columns report tests of differences in means between the three samples.  Differences in means are calculated each quarter for 
each pair of samples, and the time series of differences are used for statistical inference to control for cross-sectional correlation.  
***
 (
**
) [
*
] 
represents one-tailed statistical significance at less than 1% (5%) [10%].   
 
Variable (1) Full Sample (2) IBP Sample (3) WBP Sample (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) 
ROA 0.017 0.030 0.032 
* **  
1 year Return 0.183 0.493 0.319 
*** *** *** 
BTM 0.669 0.489 0.534 
** *  
Size 5.342 6.259 6.231 
*** ***  
Leverage 0.206 0.202 0.208 
   
Dividend yield 0.004 0.002 0.003 
   
Cash 0.167 0.198 0.177 
*   
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Volatility 0.030 0.029 0.028 
   
ΔVolatility 0.000 -0.002 -0.002    
Asset growth 0.083 0.192 0.164 
*** ***  
Insider Sale 0.400 0.483 0.462 
*** *** ** 
Insider Holding 0.025 0.016 0.015 
*** ***  
Pressure (%) 0.032 1.055 0.157 
*** ***
 
***
 
Upressure (%) 0.375 0.685 9.676 
*
 
***
 
***
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Table III: Quarterly Abnormal Stock Returns due to Mutual Fund Buying Pressure 
Panel A shows mean quarterly abnormal returns from quarters t-4 to t+6 for stocks subject to mutual fund buying 
pressure in quarter t=0.  Abnormal stock returns are industry-adjusted returns using the Fama-French equal-
weighted 48 industry portfolios.  In Panel B, abnormal returns are the alphas (intercept) from calendar-time Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor regressions.  The dependent variable in Panel B is the monthly excess return, over 
the risk-free rate, on a portfolio of IBP Stocks, and WBP Stocks, held for 3 years (upper panel) or 5 years (lower 
panel).  Mkt-Rf, SMB and HML are the Fama-French factors.  The alpha is in percentage points. Inflow-driven 
Buying Pressure (IBP) stocks are those in the top decile of Pressure, but in the middle three deciles of UPressure, in 
quarter t=0.  Widespread Buying Pressure (WBP) stocks are those in the top decile of UPressure in quarter t=0.  
The IBP (WBP) sample consists of 2,515 (17,160) stock-quarters from 1990 through 2007.  Pressure of stock i in 
quarter t is a stock-level measure of flow-motivated trading by all mutual funds j, and is calculated as  
Pressurei,t =    
 

j
,0(max( ∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t>90
th
 percentilet) – 
j
,0(max( −∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t<10
th
 percentilet)   
Shares Outstandingi,t-1  
 
UPressure is a measure of widespread trading by mutual funds that is not motivated by capital flows and is intended 
to capture information-motivated trading. The middle three deciles of UPressure capture stock quarters that are not 
subject to widespread net trading in any direction.  
UPressurei,t = {
j
∆holdingj,i,t | 10
th
 percentilet≤flowj,t≤90
th
 percentilet } / Shares Outstandingi,t-1  
In Panel A, mean abnormal returns are calculated each quarter for the portfolio of IBP stocks and WBP stocks, and 
the time series of portfolio abnormal returns are used for statistical inference to control for cross-sectional 
correlation.  
***
 (
**
) [
*
] represents one-tailed statistical significance at less than 1% (5%) [10%].   
 
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Returns 
Quarter IBP Stocks WBP Stocks 
t-4 1.99% 
**
 2.33% 
***
 
t-3 3.53% 
***
 2.24% 
***
 
t-2 2.29% 
**
 2.64% 
***
 
t-1 2.82% 
**
 3.22% 
***
 
t=0 5.12% 
***
 2.57% 
***
 
t+1 -3.10% 
***
                 -0.23% 
t+2              -1.11% -0.80% 
*
 
t+3 -2.19% 
***
                 -0.52% 
t+4              -1.55% 
**
                 -0.29% 
t+5              -1.41% 
*
                 -0.61% 
t+6              -0.45%                 -0.23% 
   
[t+1, t+6] -9.82% 
*** 
-2.68% 
*
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Panel B: Fama-French Alphas (α) 
3 year   
 IBP WBP 
α          -0.36 **               -0.08 
Mkt-Rf             1.3 
*** 
1.21 
***
 
SMB           0.68 
***
 0.61 
***
 
HML            0.07 0.33 
***
 
   
Adj. Rsq 86% 88% 
   
5 year   
 IBP WBP 
α         -0.31 **               -0.04 
Mkt-Rf 1.28 
***
 1.19 
***
 
SMB 0.66 
***
 0.61 
***
 
HML          0.12 
*
 0.34 
***
 
   
Adj. Rsq 87% 88% 
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Table IV: Timing Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Panel A reports coefficients from logit regressions of the equity issuance choice on the independent variables shown.  The dependent variable is 
1 if the firm has a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in quarter t, and zero otherwise.  Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals 1 if the stock was 
subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4.  ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets.  Cash is cash and 
short-term investments over total assets.  1-year Return is the stock return over a one-year period ending at the end of the current quarter. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets.  BTM is book value of shareholders‟ equity over market value of equity.  Leverage is long-term debt plus 
long-term debt in current liabilities, over total assets.  Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the stock price.  Volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter.  ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year.  
Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year.  The second column shows results for the full 
sample.  The last three columns show results for matched samples in which IBP stock-quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first 
matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and second matching variables are indicated at the top of the column.  Once the 
matched sample is obtained, a Logit regression is estimated with dependent and independent variables as described above.  Standard errors are 
clustered on both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering), and the samples span 1990 through 2007.  
***
 (
**
) [
*
] represents one-tailed 
statistical significance at less than 1% (5%) [10%].   Panel B reports SEO frequencies in all three matched samples.  In Panel B, SEO=1 for 
stock-quarters with an SEO, and 0 otherwise, while IBP=1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the quarters from t-1 to t-4, and 0 
otherwise.  IBP is described in the notes to Table II.  The p-value in Panel B is from a test of difference in SEO relative frequencies when 
IBP=1 vs 0. 
 
Panel A: SEO Logit Regression Coefficients 
      
 Full Sample  Matched Samples 
Variable   BTM-Size Return-Size AssetGrowth-ROA 
Intercept -6.077 
*** 
 -4.163 
***
 -4.086 
***
 -4.633 
***
 
Buy Pressure 0.461 
***
  0.403 
***
 0.260 
**
 0.607 
***
 
ROAt-4         -0.105  -2.413 
**
 -3.406 
***
 -2.754 
***
 
Casht-4 0.689 
***
  0.512 
*
        0.404              0.471 
1 year Return 0.482 
***
  0.459 
***
 0.494 
***
 0.364 
***
 
Sizet-4 0.177 
***
  -0.115 
***
 -0.077 
*
             -0.059 
BTMt-4 -0.532 
***
        -0.111 -0.592 
***
 -0.458 
***
 
Leveraget-4 0.564 
***
    1.348 
***
 1.162 
***
 1.141 
***
 
Dividend yieldt-4 -15.178 
***
      -28.904        -0.204             -1.265 
Volatilityt-4 14.659 
***
         0.335         1.542              3.318 
ΔVolatilityt,t-4         -0.611      -15.033 
***
 -12.524 
**
            -12.550 
**
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Asset growth 0.421 
***
  0.225 0.271 
*
 0.397 
***
 
Time f.e. Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry f.e. Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 9.4%  8.3% 9.2% 7.7% 
N 313750  16620 16642 16650 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: SEO Frequencies 
   Matched Samples 
SEO IBP  BTM-Size Return-Size AssetGrowth-ROA 
0 0  8202 8202 8230 
0 1  8146 8157 8163 
1 0  108 119 95 
1 1  164 164 162 
      
p-value   <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
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Table V: Timing Insider Sales 
Panel A reports coefficients from regressions of insider sales (Insider Sale) in quarter t on the independent variables shown.  Insider Sale is the 
ratio of shares sold by insiders in a firm-quarter to the sum of shares sold and purchased by insiders in that firm-quarter.  Buy Pressure is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4.  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.  1-
year Return is the stock return over a one-year period ending at the end of the current quarter.  Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over the quarter.  ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year.  BTM is book value of shareholders‟ 
equity over market value of equity, at the end of the same quarter in the prior year.  BTM is ranked into deciles from BTM1 (low BTM) to 
BTM10 (high BTM).  The BTM10 dummy is omitted.  Insider Holding is the number of shares held by insiders scaled by total shares 
outstanding.  The second column shows results for the full sample.  The last three columns show results for matched samples in which IBP 
stock-quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and second matching 
variables are indicated at the top of the column.  Once the matched sample is obtained, a regression is estimated with dependent and 
independent variables as described above.  Standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering), and the samples 
span 1990 through 2007.  
***
 (
**
) [
*
] represents one-tailed statistical significance at less than 1% (5%) [10%].  Panel B reports mean insider 
sales in all three matched samples.  In Panel B, IBP=1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the quarters from t-1 to t-4, and 0 otherwise.  
IBP is described in the notes to Table II.  The p-value in Panel B is from a test of difference in mean insider sales when IBP=1 vs 0. 
 
Panel A: Insider Sale Regression Coefficients 
      
 Full Sample  Matched Samples 
Variable   BTM-Size Return-Size Size-InsiderSalet-1 
Intercept 0.247 
*** 
 0.214 
***
 0.218 
***
 0.184 
***
 
Buy pressure 0.027 
***
  0.021 
***
 0.025 
***
 0.025 
***
 
Sizet-4 0.008 
***
  0.009 
***
 0.008 
***
 0.011 
***
 
Insider Salet-4 0.170 
***
  0.181 
***
 0.192 
***
 0.176 
***
 
1 year Return 0.062 
***
  0.063 
***
 0.061 
***
 0.060 
***
 
Volatilityt-4 -0.902 
***
        -0.071        -0.133                  -0.009 
ΔVolatilityt,t-4 -1.674 
***
  -2.172 
***
 -2.164 
***
 -2.173 
***
 
BTM1 0.094 
***
  0.090 
***
 0.093 
***
 0.101 
***
 
BTM2 0.099 
***
  0.094 
***
 0.091 
***
 0.108 
***
 
BTM3 0.088 
***
  0.067 
***
 0.056 
***
 0.084 
***
 
BTM4 0.078 
***
  0.070 
***
 0.079 
***
 0.086 
***
 
BTM5 0.069 
***
  0.069 
***
 0.056 
***
 0.075 
***
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BTM6 0.056 
***
  0.043 
**
 0.052 
***
 0.064 
***
 
BTM7 0.043 
***
         0.031 0.036 
**
 0.048 
***
 
BTM8 0.026 
***
         0.024          0.021                   0.032 
*
 
BTM9 0.025 
***
         0.014          0.013                   0.031 
*
 
Insider Holding 0.373 
***
  0.716 
***
 0.747 
***
 0.909 
***
 
Time f.e. Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry f.e. Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 8.82%  7.31% 8.00% 7.81% 
N 211227  13526 13590 13596 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Mean Insider Sales 
     
  Matched Samples 
IBP  BTM-Size Return-Size Size-InsiderSalet-1 
0  0.438 0.427 0.433 
1  0.467 0.466 0.467 
     
p-value  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
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Table VI: Timing Acquisitions 
Panel A reports coefficients from logit regressions of the acquisition choice on the independent variables shown.  The dependent variable is 1 if 
the firm engages in a stock-based acquisition in quarter t, and zero otherwise.  Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject 
to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4.  1-year Return is the stock return over a one-year period ending at the end of the current 
quarter. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.  BTM is book value of shareholders‟ equity over market value of equity.  ROA is operating 
income before depreciation over total assets. Cash is cash and short-term investments over total assets.  Dividend yield is the dividend per share 
divided by the stock price. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter.  ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from 
the same quarter in the previous year.  Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year.  The 
second column shows results for the full sample.  The last three columns show results for matched samples in which IBP stock-quarters are first 
matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and second matching variables are indicated 
at the top of the column.  Once the matched sample is obtained, a Logit regression is estimated with dependent and independent variables as 
described above.  Standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering), and the samples span 1990 through 2007.  
***
 (
**
) [
*
] represents one-tailed statistical significance at less than 1% (5%) [10%].   Panel B reports acquisition frequencies in all three matched 
samples.  In Panel B, M&A=1 for stock-quarters with an acquisition, and 0 otherwise, while IBP=1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the 
quarters from t-1 to t-4, and 0 otherwise.  IBP is described in the notes to Table II.  The p-value in Panel B is from a test of difference in 
relative acquisition frequencies when IBP=1 vs 0. 
 
Panel A: M&A Logit Regression Coefficients 
      
 Full Sample  Matched Samples 
Variable   BTM-Size Return-Size AssetGrowth-ROA 
Intercept -4.891 
*** 
 -5.120 
***
 -5.188 
***
 -5.279 
***
 
Buy pressure 0.183 
***
          0.114        0.098             0.218 
**
 
1 year Return 0.255 
***
  0.251 
***
 0.228 
***
 0.250 
***
 
Sizet-4 0.175 
***
  0.138 
***
 0.153 
***
 0.153 
***
 
BTMt-4 -0.749 
***
  -0.585 
***
 -0.557 
***
 -0.638 
***
 
ROAt-4          0.265  2.714 
***
 1.756 
*
 2.755 
***
 
Casht-4   0.374 
***
          0.177          0.156             -0.023 
Dividend yieldt-4 -6.202 
**
         12.246 11.796 
*
              8.134 
Volatilityt-4 2.992 
*
  19.161 
***
 18.819 
***
 18.846 
***
 
ΔVolatilityt,t-4         -0.276  12.138 
***
          5.321 7.259 
**
 
Asset growth 0.438 
***
  0.569 
***
 0.644 
***
  0.680 
***
 
Time f.e. Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
  
45 
Industry f.e. Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 7.2%  4.7% 4.7% 6.1% 
N 313750  16620 16642 16650 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: M&A Frequencies 
   Matched Samples 
M&A IBP  BTM-Size Return-Size AssetGrowth-ROA 
0 0  8085 8108 8125 
0 1  8043 8056 8057 
1 0  225 213 200 
1 1  267 265 268 
      
p-value   0.02 <0.01 <0.01 
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Figure 1: The figure shows cumulative average abnormal returns of stocks subject to buying pressure by mutual 
funds. Abnormal returns are industry-adjusted returns, using the Fama-French equal-weighted 48 industry portfolios.  
We sum average quarterly abnormal returns to obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns. Inflow-driven 
Buying Pressure (IBP) stocks are those in the top decile of Pressure, but in the middle three deciles of UPressure, in 
quarter t=0.  Widespread Buying Pressure (WBP) stocks are those in the top decile of UPressure in quarter t=0.  
The IBP (WBP) sample consists of 2,515 (17,160) stock-quarters from 1990 through 2007.  Pressure of stock i in 
quarter t is a stock-level measure of flow-motivated trading by all mutual funds j, and is calculated as  
Pressurei,t =    
 

j
,0(max( ∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t>90
th
 percentilet) – 
j
,0(max( −∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t<10
th
 percentilet)   
Shares Outstandingi,t-1  
 
UPressure is a measure of widespread trading by mutual funds that is not motivated by capital flows and is intended 
to capture information-motivated trading. The middle three deciles of UPressure capture stock quarters that are not 
subject to widespread net trading in any direction.  
UPressurei,t = {
j
∆holdingj,i,t | 10
th
 percentilet≤flowj,t≤90
th
 percentilet } / Shares Outstandingi,t-1  
